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Grameen
Bank, Micro-Credit and
The
Wall Street Journal |
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Muhammad
Yunus
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| A
Story Which WSJ Missed |
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The
WSJ missed an opportunity to deliver some good news to the
world at a time when we are so hungry for it. The appropriate
story and the headline could have been : "Grameen Bank
Overcoming Repayment Snag : Proves Credit for the Poor Sustainable
Under Difficult Conditions". That's what it really
is. Grameen's problem loans have declined over the past sixteen
months by 50 percent. Trend shows that the repayment rate
will reach 95 percent within the next six months. We expect
that by December, 2002, repayment rate will reach 98 per cent.
Instead, the WSJ chose to present a snap shot to the world,
ignoring the positive trend, to show that the repayment rate
at the time of writing the report was 90 percent, instead
of 95 percent, and built the major thrust of the story around
it.
I
felt very happy that the WSJ endorsed microcredit as a "great
idea". It indeed is. It is a very effective instrument
to empower the poor, particularly the poor women, in all cultures
and economies of the world. It is cost-effective, sustainable
and works in a business-way. It gives a poor person a chance
to take destiny in his/her own hands and get out of poverty
with his/her own efforts. The world, which has committed itself
to reduce the number of poor people by half by 2015, will
find micro-credit a powerful tool in its tool box.
The
WSJ article points out that Grameen Bank
(a) is not as good as it claims. It conceals its repayment
rate to make it look good.
(b) Grameen's accounting system, the procedure for determining
the overdue, and making provisions for them does to follow
industry standard.
(c) and it further predicts that Grameen's future will be
worse, because it is "delaying inevitable defaults and
hiding problem loans".
Whatever
accounting system, procedures and definions we have today,
we had them with us for the last twenty-five years. Grameen
is probably the most researched institution in the world.
Books have been written on those research findings, students
got their PH.Ds around the world doing their research on Grameen;
the World Bank conducted a multi-year multi-million dollar
research project on Grameen Bank; thousands of experts visited
us pouring over our books nobody headed for the alarm
on Grameen's system, procedures and definitions. Many expressed
their discomfort, dissatisfaction, unhappiness that we do
not follow the "industry standards"
but did not think our system and procedure had any fault.
We always argued that as long as we are generating all the
information to produce every single table, index or ratio
familiar in the conventional banking world, anybody can translate
our information into their information. We do what we need
to do. It works fine with us.
Conventional
banks do not lend money to the poor because they do not consider
them creditworthy. We demonstrated that there is nothing wrong
with the poor. Existing bank rules, procedures and concepts
are at fault. We created a bank based on completely new set
of premises and procedures. Unlike conventional banks, this
bank is based on trust. We have no legal instruments between
the lender and the borrower. Grameen is owned by the borrowers.
Nine elected representatives of the borrowers make up the
board of Grameen, besides three top government officials (usually
from the finance ministry) and the CEO. The board was chaired
by the Finance Secretary to the Government of Bangladesh from
1991 to 1996, and succeded by Professor Rehman Sobhan, an
internationally reputed economist, who is still the chairman.
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| A
Counter-Culture for the Banking World |
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Grameen
had to create a banking counter-culture of its own. Grameen's
central focus is to help the poor borrower move out of poverty,
and not make money. Making profit is always recognised as
a necessary condition of success to show that we are covering
costs. Volume of profit is not important in Grameen in money-making
sense, but important as an indicator of efficiency. We
would like to make more profit so that we can reduce interest
rate --- and pass on the benefits to the borrowers. In Grameen
system when a borrower cannot pay back, we try to activate
our system to help her overcome her problems, rather than
go in a punishing mode.
We
consider credit as a human right. We built our system on
the faith that the poor always pay back. Sometimes they take
longer than the originally scheduled time for repayment. Sometimes
natural disasters like flood, drought, cyclone etc and even
political unrest, rules and procedures of the bank, make it
difficult or impossible to pay back; but given the opportunity,
they do pay back. Non-repayment is not a problem created by
the borrowers, it is created by factors external to them.
We
have always carefully avoided the practices of the conventional
banks to make sure we do not fall into the same logical loop
which kept the poor out of the financial institutions. Grameen
had to create new systems to balance financial and human considerations.
For example, it presents loan information separately for women
and men, lists meticulously every single business of the borrowers
in its annual report, and recognizes that a house is not just
a house, but a workplace for the poor women, Something that
is categorised as a consumption loan by the conventional banks,
is actually a production loan for the poor. Grameen is a system
based on human-relationships, not on threats of penalty imposed
by legal system or any other agency. Grameen required
a new style of business, a new banking culture of its own.
Sometimes,
people who are used to conventional banking become suspicious
of Grameen because it is different. It is a conflict of two
different banking cultures. Just because they do not understand
us, they think we are wrong. When they spend some time with
us with patience, they start enjoying the exciting world of
Grameen banking.
Grameen
is owned by 2.4 million borrower, 95 per cent of them women.
It is almost like a co-op. It is a closed club. Borrowers
save, they borrow. Over the last 25 years they took cumulative
total loans of Tk 151.88 billion ($ 3.5 billion) and repaid
Tk 139.17 billion ($ 3.2 billion). The present outstanding
amount is Tk 12.71 billion. When we "worry" about
repayment problems, we are "worrying" about the
borrowers who already paid back collectively $ 3.2 billion
! The WSJ looks at the dollar figures and gets worried. We
look at our hardworking struggling poor women who have already
demonstrated their capability to repay their loans many times
over. We have good reasons to feel confident. Today 85 per
cent of the 2.4 million borrowers are paying back their loans
with clockwork precision. Only 15 per cent of them are having
difficulties in paying back --- that situation was created
by our standardised procedures. Borrowers are also depositors.
They have a total of Tk 6.5 billion as balance in their savings
account. Fifteen per cent of the borrowers who are having
temporary difficulties in paying back their loans, also have
their balance in their savings accounts.
Grameen
has stopped accepting new donor money for its operation since
1995. It has borrowed Tk 3.0 billion ($ 60 million) locally
to give fresh loans during the devastating floods of 1998.
This amount will be fully repaid in May, 2002, without requiring
Grameen to borrow again to replace it. Now, Grameen generates
enough savings, mostly from its borrowers, to repay its loans
and finance its future growth. Because of steady flow of deposits,
Grameen does not see any need to borrow in the future. It
has always paid back its domestic and international loans
exactly on the dot. It will continue to do so in future..
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| Nature
of Repayment Problem |
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Repayment
problem was born because of our standard methodology applied
in a national disaster situation, not because of the borrowers'
reluctance to pay back. It always amazes me how sincere
the poor are in paying back their loans. If a bank staff meets
a defaulting borrower, who has discontinued her contact with
the bank for a period of several years, and reminds her about
the outstanding loan, she never says "Forget it",
or "Who Cares". She always says: "I am sorry,
I could not pay back. I'll like to do that as soon as I can".
Given an opportunity she always does that.
The
repayment problem was created immediately after the devastating
floods of 1998 (half of the country was under flood water
for ten weeks, water flowed over the roof-tops), when we disbursed
fresh loans without requiring the borrowers to pay back the
existing loans. We explained to them that they do not have
to worry about the existing loans, this will be converted
into a long-term loan. New loans will be their current loan.
But we did not change the status of the previous loans in
our books. Our internal reasoning was that this will make
monitoring easier even though repayment rate will show a decline.
We'll always understand why the decline took place. But in
reality repayment problem did not remain as an accounting
phenomenon, it became a real phenomenon - some borrowers found
the loan burden too heavy and discontinued paying their installments.
The
WSJ says we forgave the previous loans during the flood. This
is not correct. Grameen never forgives loans. Bulk of the
amount we are now describing as overdue loans are these previous
loans.
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| New
Generalised System |
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Gradually
we started noticing that our rules were not appropriate for
the borrowers in this situation. We took a long preparation
to develop a new flexible system and field-tested it over
months. We finally introduced the new system in September
of 2000. It is a simplified and generalised Grameen system.
This can work equally well both in normal and disaster situations.
It allows the enterprising borrowers to move ahead faster.
Everybody fell in love with it. Borrowers loved it, Grameen
staff loved it - because it is so simple, it can offer tailor-made
loans rather than previous single-size-fits-all type of loans.
Good news for the WSJ, the questions they raised about provisioning,
defining overdue, repayment rate etc have become irrelevant
in the context of Grameen's new generalised system.
New
system, basically has two types of loans (a) Basic loan, and
(b) Flexible loan. A borrower can take a basic loan for any
income-generating purpose. It can be of any duration mutually
agreed between the bank and the borrower, unlike the old system
where all loans were for just one year. Basic loans can be
for 3 months or 6 months, or for 2 years or 3 years. Unlike
the old system, now amounts of weekly repayments can be varied
during the loan period, according to the pre-negotiated amounts
documented in an agreed repayment schedule.
Borrower
has to pass through a very strict six-monthly loan quality
check-point. If a borrower fails to pay the total amount she
is supposed to pay according to the repayment, during the
past six-months, she is classified as a defaulter. Now the
entire unrepaid amount, even if it is the first six months
of a 3 year loan, becomes overdue. Hundred per cent provision
will be made for all overdue loans, unless it is converted
into a "flexible loan".
If
a defaulter wants to continue to repay her overdue loans,
she can do it by converting the overdue amount into a flexible
loan. Flexible loan is actually a rescheduled loan. She can
negotiate her repayment schedule. Fifty per cent provisioning
will be made for the outstanding amount under the flexible
loan, even if her repayment rate is 100 per cent. If a borrower
fails to repay the flexible loan according to the schedule,
the loan becomes overdue, and hundred per cent provisioning
will be made for the overdue loan. The borrower will again
have the option to renegotiate the loan and convert it into
a flexible loan.
Fifty-five
per cent of borrowers of Grameen have already moved from the
old system of multiple loans, to the generalised single loan
system. Now it has become easy to check the quality of the
loans; basic loans mean loans having hundred per cent repayment,
while flexible loans mean loans at risk. Year 2002 will be
the year of completion of the transition process from the
old system to the new system. By the time this transition
process will be completed, our guess is 85 per cent of the
borrowers will be on basic loans and 15 per cent on flexible
loans. The aggregate repayment rate will be 98 per cent and
above. In the new system the repayment rate is determined
by the ratio between what was the weekly installment the borrower
agreed to pay on a particular week according to the repayment
schedule, and what is the amount she actually paid. It would
no longer be determined under the old method. We'll not have
any misunderstanding left on this issue.
Fifty-one
per cent of our 1170 branches now have switched to computerised
book-keeping and MIS. We hope to have 85 per cent of our branches
come into computerised book-keeping and MIS by the end of
2002. This makes it easier for the generalised Grameen system
to offer all its attractive features for the benefit of the
borrowers.
The
new system has brought another excitement and inter-branch
competition in Grameen. This system has introduced a grading
system for branches. This grading system awards colour-coded
"stars" to indicate the quality of performance of
a branch. If a branch (typically 2,500 borrowers) has 100
per cent repayment record for two consecutive years, it is
awarded a green star. If the repayment falls below it during
any two successive years, the star is lost. A branch can similarly
earn stars for earning profit (blue star), for carrying out
its entire loan program with its own deposits, even generating
surplus of deposits for the use of other branches (violet
star), by making sure that hundred per cent of the children
of Grameen families are in school or have graduated from primary
school (brown star), by making sure that all the borrowers
in the branch have crossed over the poverty line, certified
through an evaluation of each family with a rigorous ten-point
test of Grameen (red star). Branch staff can actually wear
the stars as a badge of honor and display their stars in the
branch stationery to show their achievement.
Now
there are 388 branches with one star or more. There are 10
branches with 4 stars. No five star branch yet! We are expecting
that by the end of next year branches with at least one star
will increase to 550, that is nearly one-half of all branches.
We hope to find at least one branch with 5 stars. Someday
we hope all our branches will be five star branches. That's
our mission --- to make all our branches five star branches.
Our 12,000 staff work very hard to make that dream come true.
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| Central
Bank Supervision |
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We
can raise our repayment rate to 100 per cent instantaneously
by a simple decision to write off all our overdue loans. We
have more money in our loan-loss reserve (Tk 3.8 billion)
than the present overdue loans. But we chose not to go that
way, we want to do it the harder way --- by improving the
repayment situation and recover the overdue amount. We do
not want to abandon our borrowers/owners by disqualifying
them to remain within the Grameen fold. We want them to change
their life with Grameen, by solving their problems with Grameen.
We don't want to push them away with their problems. We never
think of walking away from them. If they don't succeed, there
is no reason for us to exist.
The
WSJ gives the impression that Grameen makes less than required
loan-loss provisioning. Industry standard in Bangladesh is
set by the central bank of Bangladesh. We make more generous
loan-loss provisioning than the central bank wants us to do.
Central bank of Bangladesh has the responsibility of audit
and inspection over us. They check our books carefully. We
have never heard any complaint from them about our provisioning
criteria in the past.
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| Factual
Error About PKSF |
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WSJ
says PKSF was set up in 1991 "to distribute foreign funds
to other Bangladesh micro-lenders". WSJ could not be
more wrong. You give a bad name to another reputed world-class
organization. PKSF was set up to resist donor money. It started
out by stubbornly refusing donor money which was put at its
doors. PKSF did that not because it did not need money, it
did that because it did not want the dependency that comes
with receiving the donor money. PKSF started out with 100
per cent Bangladesh government money. It developed its own
organizational and operational style. It established its own
credibility as a sound financial organization. When it knew
exactly what it wants, how it wants, firmly set up the standard
for its program, only then it opened its doors for the donor
money on its own terms. Now international donors come to give
money to PKSF. But since PKSF knows how much money it needs,
and for what, most of the time PKSF is saying, "No, thank
you" to the donors.
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| Concealing
Information |
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Grameen
always tried to remain as transparent as an organization can
be. It started to distribute widely its monthly statement,
containing all basic information about its operation from
February, 1980, nearly twenty-two years back, when it was
not even a bank yet. It contained all information about disbursement,
repayment, borrower numbers etc. all disaggregated by gender,
and by region. It never failed to produce it and distribute
it globally every single month for the last 262 months! Among
the many universities, donors, and libraries who receive this
monthly statement, US Library of Congress is one. One may
not like our information format, but nobody can complain that
we do not share our information. Web-site never became part
of our management system. It was the product of IT enthusiasts
in the bank. It remained unattended and unupdated. Sorry that
it carried wrong information on our repayment rate! Your reporter
collected samples of old monthly statements beginning from
the very first one in 1980 and quoted from the most-recent
monthly statement, but did not mention its existence in the
report.
We
publish our Annual Report every year. This contains, besides
many other interesting economic, financial, and social information,
balance sheet, profit and loss accounts, and cash flow statement
for the year, audited by two top audit firms of the country,
which are affiliated with international audit firms. Nobody
ever complained that these reports lacked anything by way
of disclosure.
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| Safety
of Depositors' Money |
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Ninety
per cent of Grameen deposits come from the borrowers. They
borrow several times more money from Grameen than the money
they put in their accounts. So the safety of their deposits
is automatically guaranteed. Again, they are the owners of
the bank too.
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| A
Proposal for WSJ |
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Grameen
has just reached its twenty-fifth birthday. It has been a
long way to get here. It is the only bank in the world owned
by poor women. We did not expect the most highly respected
financial daily of the world would rush to negative conclusions
about us without giving us a fair hearing.
I
have a proposal for the WSJ. I propose that the WSJ send two
top financial reporters (of whom at least one should be a
woman) to Grameen for two weeks or more to find answers to
the following questions:
a)
Will Grameen have more overdue loans (by any definition they
choose) one year from now than it is today? Will there be
an increase in non-performing loans?
b)
Is Grameen's repayment rate (by any definition they choose)
likely to be lower one year from now?
c)
Do they find Grameen's reporting system transparent and adequate?
You
owe this to Grameen, to its owners, to the large network of
committed social entrepreneurs who follow Grameen in their
work, as well as to the millions of poor women and their families
around the world who would have benefited from micro-loans
if you had not put a cloud over Grameen and confused the policy-makers
in a year, when world leaders will be frantically looking
for solutions to massive global poverty.
I
hope you'll find my proposal very reasonable.
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